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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
* * *

UTAH CONSTITUTION
1)

Utah Const. Art. I § 24 [Uniform operation of laws]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

2)

Utah Const. Art I § 11,(1896) [Courts open-Redress of
injuries]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

3)

Utah Const. Art XVI § 5, (1896) [Injuries resulting in d e a t h Damages]
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in
death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall
not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where
compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law.

STATUTES
1)

Lord Campbell's Act- Comp. Laws Territory of Utah 1874; 2
Comp.l888§2961.
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would,
IV

if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then,
and in every such case, the person who, or the company or
corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of the person injured, and although the death shall have
been caused under such circumstances as amount to law to felony.

2)

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301 et. seq.(2007). Waivers
immunity—Exceptions

of

(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as
to any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of
an employee committed within the scope of employment.
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived
under Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
* * *

(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement;

3)

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-2-101, et seq. (2007). Licensure of
Programs and Facilities
U.C.A. 62-2-101 Definitions
(12) 'Human services licensee' or 'licensee' means a youth
program, resource family home, or a facility or program,
licensed by the department, that provides care, secure
treatment, inpatient treatment, residential treatment,
residential support, adult day care, outpatient treatment,
domestic violence treatment, child placing services, or social
detoxification.

v

U.C.A. § 62A-2-101(12)(2007).

4)

Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-7-101. (2007) D e f i n i t i o n s
(3) "Community-based program" means a nonsecure residential or
nonresidential program designated to supervise and rehabilitate
youth offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent with
public safety, and designated or operated by or under contract
with the division.
(20) "Secure facility" means any facility operated by or under
contract with the division, that provides 24-hour supervision and
confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for
custody and rehabilitation
(26) "Youth offender" means a person 12 years of age or older, and
who has not reached 21 years of age, committed or admitted by
the juvenile court to the custody, care, and jurisdiction of the
division, for confinement in a secure facility or supervision in the
community, following adjudication for a delinquent act which
would constitute a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an
adult.

5)

Utah Code Ann § 62A-7-104(8) Division's R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
(8) In any order committing a youth offender to the division, the
juvenile court shall specify whether the youth offender is being
committed for secure confinement or placement in a communitybased program. The division shall place the youth offender in the
most appropriate program within the category specified by the
court.

VI

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue #1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's
Certification of Question of State Law: Is a juvenile delinquent
place in a community-based proctor home incarcerated in a place
of legal confinement, such that Utah has not waived its state
sovereign immunity for injuries arising our of, in connection with,
or resulting from his placement, pursuant to the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)(j)?
Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)(j) gives immunity to the State for a
person who is incarcerated in a place of legal confinement.

The

Juvenile's courts authority to place a child in the custody of the state
comes from Utah's Youth Offenders Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-7-101, et
seq. It is the Youth Offenders Act that determines if a child in state
custody is incarcerated or to be placed in a community based program.
The Utah District Court correctly analyzed the Youth Offenders Act and
Utah's case law to determine that Dillon was not incarcerated in a place
of legal confinement.

Specifically citing Utah law, "The Court of

Appeals of Utah has stated that to incarcerate "is to imprison or to
confine" Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT App. 494 ^ 6, 153
P.3d 789, 790 (2006). In setting forth the laws pertaining to Juvenile
Justice Services, the Utah legislature set forth that youth offenders are
1

either placed in "confinement in a secure facility or supervised in the
community."

Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-7-101(26) (2006 & Supp. 2008)

(emphasis added). A "secure facility" means any facility operated by or
under contract with the division, that provides 24-hour supervision and
confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for custody
and rehabilitation.

Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In contrast, a "community-

based program" as defined by the legislature, "means a non-secure
residential or nonresidential program designed to supervise and
rehabilitate youth offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent
with public safety, and design or operated by or under contract with the
division." Id. § 62A-7-101(3).
Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to confine
Dillon in a secure facility but to place him in a community-based
program, where he would be supervised and rehabilitated "in the least
restrictive setting, consistent with public safety."

Id.

As the facts

demonstrated Dillon was under little to no supervision from the State,
which had no contact with Dillon for months, or the proctor home,
which let Dillon come and go freely around the community as he

2

pleased. The District Court therefore correctly determined that Dillon
Whitney was not "incarcerated" in a "place of legal confinement."
If the Supreme Court of Utah certifies the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals question of State Law in the affirmative; by finding children in
proctor care are incarcerated pursuant to Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)(j)
the GIA would violate Utah Constitution's, Art. I § 24 "Uniform
Operation of Laws;" Art I § 11 "Open Courts Claus;" and Art. XVI § 5
"Wrongful Death Clause." These issues were preserved for the Tenth
Circuit and presented in the Brief of Appellee's at the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals pages 15-23.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Certification of State Law is based on the State's Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim based upon the Governmental
Immunity Act, Incarceration Exception to the Negligence Waiver. The
State lost the motion at the District Court, which determined a child in
a proctor home was not incarcerated in a legal place of confinement.
The State of Utah defendants appealed the District Courts order to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The State was
entitled to the Appeal as a right based upon the Governmental
3

Immunity Act. The arguments were fully briefed and argued at the
United State Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit
certified a question of State law to the Supreme Court of Utah and on
January 19, 2011 this Court accepted the certified question of state law.
STATEMENT FACTS
In early 2007 the honorable Andrew Valdez placed Dillon on
probation and within the care and custody of Division of Juvenile
Justice Services (DJJS) for placement in a diversion

program.

Appellee's Correct Brief, U.S. Court App. 10th Circ. p. 8. DJJS placed
Dillon in a wilderness diversion program at Journey Ranch. Id.
On June 9, 2007 Dillon was "terminated" from Journey and placed
in custody at the Salt Lake Valley Detention Center ("SLVDC"). Id. On
June 22, 2007 Dillon was "released" from the SLVDC and placed in the
Observation & Assessment program ("O&A"). Id. On August 15, 2007,
Judge Valdez, terminated Dillon's previous order regarding his
placement at the Observation & Assessment facility and ordered the
Division of Juvenile Justice Services ("DJJS") to place Dillon in a secure
and safe community-based placement. Id. The order specifically states,
"the minor's removal from the home and placement with the Division of
4

Juvenile Justice Services is in the best interest of the minor." Id. DJJS
placed Dillon in a proctor home where Dillon was provided a basement
mother-in-law apartment with another proctor child. Id at p.6. The
proctor children had access to and used an unmonitored unguarded
basement side entrance and exit. Id at pp6-7. Dillon was allowed to
come and go at-will. Id at p. 7. While at the proctor home the State
through DJJS lost track of Dillon. Id.
On three separate occasions in early Sept. 2007, Dillon's State
caseworker, Huy Nguyen, was unsuccessful in attempting to locate
Dillon. Id. Dillon's proctor home informed Nguyen that it was hard to
"get hold of [Dillon] after school." Id. Nguyen left the Division and as a
result he never again made contact with Dillon. Id. Dillon was without
a caseworker for a month. Id. On October 30, 2007, two months after
Nguyen left, Dillon met his new caseworker, Kyle Lancaster. Id. Dillon
met with caseworker Lancaster on only one other occasion. Id.

On

Thanksgiving Day November 22, 2007, Dillon went on an approved
home visit to his father's house. Id. On Friday Dillon failed to return to
his proctor home, apparently he snuck in the basement door changed
clothes and left again. Id. Dillon's proctor parent called and informed
5

the tracker at the agency of Dillon's absence.

Id. The tracker was

spending the weekend in St George. Id. The tracker placed a single
unanswered phone call in an attempt to locate Dillon. Id at p. 8.
On November 23, 2007 Dillon went to the home of Victor
Hernandez.

Id.

On November 24, 2007 Dillon fell down a flight of

seventeen stairs. Id. Afterwards Dillon was placed on the couch in Mr.
Hernandez apartment.

Id.

On November 25, 2007 Mr. Hernandez

fearing Dillon had died, placed him outside on the steps. Id. Neighbors
notified paramedics, who transported Dillon to Salt Lake Regional
Hospital. Id.

On November 25 at 7:00 a.m. en-route to the hospital

Dillon Whitney died; three days after Dillon was first noticed missing
and fifteen hours after he fell down the stairs. Id.
For three days Dillon was missing, no one from the State of Utah,
the proctor home or the agency was searching for him. Id. Nor for the
three days Dillon was missing did any one from the State of Utah, D JJS
or Quest reported Dillon missing to any authority who could locate him
as required by Utah Law U.C.A. §62A-7-104(10)(a). Id. Dillon was in a
proctor home that allowed him to violate the laws of the State of Utah,

6

the Court's order, and the policy and procedures of the Division of
Juvenile Justice Services. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, Dillon Whitney was not "incarcerated" in a "place of legal
confinement" at the time of his death. The United States District Court
For the District of Utah correctly interpreted Utah's Youth Corrections'
Act's (U.C.A. § 63A-7-101 et seq.) by determining Dillon's placement out
in the community did not qualify as incarceration in a place of legal
confinement.
The Youth Correction's Act gives the statutory authority of the
juvenile justice court to both confine and incarcerate a child or to place
the child in the community. In particular the act provides the juvenile
justice court judge the discretion to place a juvenile offender in either a
place of "confinement in a secure facility or supervision in the
community."
added).

U.C.A.§ 62A-7-101(26)(2006 & Supp.

2008)(Emphasis

Utah Courts have defined incarcerate "is to imprison or

confine." The Act defines "secure facility" means any facility operated
by or under contract with the division, that provides 24-hour
supervision and confinement for youth offenders committed to the
7

division for custody and rehabilitation. Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In contrast
a "community-based program" as defined by the legislature, "means a
non-secure residential or nonresidential program designed to supervise
and rehabilitate youth offenders in the least restrictive setting,
consistent with public safety, and designated or operated by or under
contract with the division."

Id. § 62A-7-101(3).

The District Court

correctly interpreted the Act's definition and found:
Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to
confine Dillon to a secure facility but to place him in a
community-based program, where he would be supervised
and rehabilitated "in the least restrictive setting, consistent
with public safety." Id. the court cannot conclude that Dillon
was "incarcerated" in a place of "legal confinement" for
purposes of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Therefore, the State Defendants are not entitled to
immunity under the incarceration exception to the waiver of
governmental immunity for negligence.
Second, to extend the definition of an incarcerated person in a
place of legal confinement to include a proctor child is to extend the
definition of a place of legal confinement to include the entire
community.

Dillon was free to wander the community without any

restrictions on any locations. His only restrictions set by the juvenile
court was whom he could have contact with, yet even these restrictions
were ignored by the State and by his proctor parent.
8

Third, this is a question of state law to determine if a child in
proctor home is incarcerated, yet the State cannot escape liability if a
child in a proctor home is considered incarcerated without violating
Utah's Constitution. In particular if Dillon was considered "incarcerated
in a legal place of confinement/' the incarceration exception as applied
to Dillon Whitney would be unconstitutional pursuant to the "uniform
operations of law clause/' "open courts clause/' and the "wrongful death
clause."
What is critical in a "uniform operation of laws" constitutional
analysis is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not
operate uniformly if "persons similarly situated" are not "treated
similarly" or if "persons in different circumstances" are "treated as if
their circumstances were the same." In 1983 the Supreme Court of
Utah determined that a child in foster care could sue for his/her
negligent placement. The statute that regulates a foster home is the
same statute that regulates a proctor home. Therefore a proctor child
or his/her parents should be given the same rights to recover for the
States negligence as a foster child or his/her parents who is placed in
the same home under the same conditions and situations.
9

In an "open courts clause" analysis the courts look to see if a
statute as applied to a particular situation abrogates a right that
existed when the act was created. In this case, the State of Utah has
recognized that negligent placement of children outside their homes are
valid common law causes of action against the state, as such, if applied
to Ms. Whitney it would abrogate her rights for a cause of action
against the State for the negligent placement of her child, Dillon.
Unlike the "open courts clause" the "wrongful death clause" is
violated when a statute violates a cause of action for wrongful death
that existed at the time the constitution was adopted. The Supreme
Court of Utah in Tiede v. State of Utah 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1986) entire
premise was based upon the erroneous assumption that when Utah's
constitution was adopted the State could not be sued for wrongful
death. This is plainly wrong, when three years prior to adoption of the
constitution, Utah adopted Lord Campbell's act (a survivor statute)
allowing negligence actions to survive a person's death. Since the State
could be sued for negligence at the adoption of its constitution it could
be sued for wrongful death.

10

ARGUMENT
Appellate courts apply a three-part test to determine whether a
governmental entity is immune from suit under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, and the test assesses, (1) whether the activity taken is a
governmental function; (2) whether the governmental immunity was
waived for the particular activity; (3) whether there is an exception to
that waiver. Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, | 8 , 191 P.3d 4, 7. In this case it
is undisputed that placement of children in foster and/or proctor care is
a governmental function and it is undisputed that the government
waived its immunity for negligence.
The only issue is whether or not an exception exists for the
waiver. The State claims the incarceration exception applied and that
Dillon Whitney was incarcerated in a place legal confinement.

The

Utah District Court determined that Dillon Whitney, who was in a
proctor home and free to come and go as he pleased, did not fit the
definition of a person "incarcerated" in a "place of legal confinement."
The State Appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit certified
the following question of state law to this Court to determine:
Is a juvenile delinquent placed in a community-based proctor
home incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, such that
11

Utah has not waived its state sovereign immunity for
injuries arising out of, in connection with, or resulting from
his placement, pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act
of Utah, Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)0').
First, Dillon Whitney was not incarcerated in a place of legal
confinement by its very definition. To be incarceration the person must
be restricted in his movements, yet Dillon was permitted to go to any
place that was legal for any other sixteen-year-old child. Dillon was
merely restricted on who he was allowed to visit. Second, extending the
definition of incarceration in a legal place of confinement to include
children in proctor homes who have free run of the community would
make the term legal place of confinement meaningless. Third, a finding
that a child in a proctor home is incarcerated and the Government has
not waived its immunity would violate Utah Constitution's, Equal
Protection Clause, Open Courts Clause and Wrongful Death Clause.
I)

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE
YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT TO DETERMINE THAT DILLON
WAS NOT "INCARCERATED" IN A "PLACE OF LEGAL
CONFINEMENT."
The district courts

analysis correctly revolved around

the

statutory issue as to whether or not Dillon Whitney's ("Dillon")
placement in a community setting would be considered incarcerated in
12

a place of legal confinement. When interpreting a statute a court begins
with the plain language. Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT
84, Tf 9, 173 P.3d 166, 168 (Utah 2007). In conducting a textual analysis
when interpreting a statute, a court must consider the literal meaning
of each term and avoid interpretations that will render portions of a
statute superfluous or inoperative. Id. Utah's Governmental Immunity
Act (UGIA) provides immunity to the State if a person is injured
negligently when "incarcerated" in a "place of legal confinement." Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)G)(West

Supp. 2009).

Utah's Youth

Corrections Act provides discretion to the juvenile justice judge to either
place the youth offender in a "secure confinement or placement in a
community-based placement." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-104(8)(2006)
(emphasis

added),1

"'[cjommunity-based

Utah's Youth
program'

[as]

a

Corrections Act defines
nonsecure

residential

a
or

nonresidential program designated to supervise and rehabilitate youth
offenders in the least restrictive setting..." Id at §62A-7-101(4).

In

contrast, the Appellate Court of Utah defined "incarcerate is to
imprison or to confine." Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT
1

In 2008 this same statutory requirement is found in U.C.A § 62A-7104(4)(Supp. 2008)
13

App 494, ^ 6, 153 P.3d 789, 790 (Utah App 2006). "Confinement is
generally understood as the act of imprisoning or restraining someone."
Id.

In this case, the juvenile justice court and DJJS chose to place

Dillon in a non-secure residential community-based proctor home
placement, where Dillon was free to travel around the community.
The Honorable Dale Kimball at the District Court of Utah
accurately analyzed Utah's Youth Offenders Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 62A7-101, et seq. and Utah's case law and correctly determined Dillon was
not incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, specifically finding:
The Court of Appeals of Utah has stated that to incarcerate
"is to imprison or to confine." Pace u. St George City Police
Dept. 2006 UT App 494 1f 6, 153 P.3d 789, 790. (2006). In
setting forth the laws pertaining to Juvenile Justice
Services, the Utah legislature set forth that youth offenders
are either placed in "confinement in a secure facility or
supervised in the community." Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-7101(26) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added) A "secure
facility" means any facility operated by or under contract
with the division, that provides 24-hour supervision and
confinement for youth offenders committed to the division
for custody and rehabilitation. Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In
contrast, a "community-based program" as defined by the
legislature, "means a nonsecure residential or nonresidential
program designed to supervise and rehabilitate youth
offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent with
public safety, and design or operated by or under contract
with the division." Id. § 62A-7-101(3).

14

Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to
confine Dillon in a secure facility but to place him in a
community-based program, where he would be supervised
and rehabilitated "in the least restrictive setting, consistent
with public safety." Id. The court cannot conclude that
Dillon was "incarcerated" in a place of "legal confinement"
for purposes of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Therefore, the State Defendants are not entitled to
immunity under the incarceration exception to the waiver of
governmental immunity for negligence.
Aplt App. 136, Dist. Ct. Order, P.9.
It is undisputed that Dillon had his own exit and entrance to his
mother-in-law apartment, that he was permitted to go to school, to play
with friends after school, and free to come and go as he pleased. Dillon
was just not incarcerated in a legal place of confinement.
II)

THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE IS NOT A PLACE OF LEGAL
CONFINEMENT.
To extend the definition of an incarcerated person in a place of

legal confinement to include a proctor child is to extend the definition of
a place of legal confinement to include the entire community. A child
who is free2 to wander the community at large cannot by its very
definition be incarcerated. In every instance where the Utah appellate
courts have interpreted the incarceration exception to negligence, "it

The antonym of incarceration is freedom.
15

arose out of, in connection with, or resulted from" a person who was in
jail, on his way to jail, escaped from jail, or was confined to some
institution or some physical location. Where the State was immune
from suit pursuant to the incarceration exception, not one person had
the freedom to come and go from the facility or location where they were
held.

Specifically in Emery v. State, a voluntary in-patient was

considered incarcerated because she was required to wait for 24-hours
to leave the facility after she formally applied to leave the state
hospital.

483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971).

In Epting v. State, an

"incarcerated" prisoner was on a "work release" program that was
transported, monitored, and controlled each day at the prison, at his
work site and while traveling in-between each location. 546 P.2d 242,
243 (Utah 1976). In Kirk v. State, an "incarcerated" prisoner escaped
while being escorted to the courthouse by sheriffs. 784 P.2d 1255, 1257
(Utah 1989).

In Peck v. State, an "incarcerated" handcuffed person

confined to a spot of ground fell forward while in front of the police
cruiser. 2008 UT 39 f 3, 191 P.3d 4, 6 (Utah 2008). In Pace v. St George
City Police Dep't, the incarcerated person was not permitted to leave a
police station even though he was not formally booked into the jail. 153
16

P.3d 789, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). In Madsen v. State, an inmate was
considered incarcerated who died after he had surgery performed at the
prison. 583 P.2d 92, 92 (Utah 1978). All these cases demonstrate that
an incarcerated person be restricted from leaving a certain place.
In contrast, sixteen-year-old-Dillon was free to wander the
community at will without any additional restrictions 3 placed upon him
by the legislature, the courts or the state. The Youth Correction Act
does not limit a child in a community-based place to any one location.
The only restrictions placed on Dillon were by the court that limited
whom he could have contacted with, yet the court did not prevent him
from any other places in the community. The State workers did not
limit where Dillon could go and the proctor parent allowed Dillon to do
anything he chose and even went beyond by simply ignoring the Court's
no contact order4.

In fact, Dillon was free to come and go from his

proctor's house. Dillon had his own unmonitored entrance/exit to the

3

The State restricts any sixteen-year-old child by curfews, and places
such as bars etc. These children certainly could not be considered
incarcerated in a legal place of confinement any more then could Dillon.
4
If a person had a restraining order against them, and they happen to
fall down a flight of stairs negligently constructed by the city, the city
would certainly not be immune from suit based upon the incarceration
exception,
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proctor's home. Dillon's location was not known during the day, and by
all indications was not even monitored at night. In fact during the day
it was expected that he would go around the community as he was given
an unlimited bus pass.
The State's caseworkers did not get concerned when they were
unable to locate Dillon on multiple occasions, since it was expected that
he would be out in the community. As plead in the complaint and the
record clearly demonstrate: DJJS and the proctor could not locate Dillon
on at least three separate occasions, noting "it was hard to get hold of
him [Dillon] after school." This caseworker moved to St. George and
never did see Dillon again. Dillon remained without a caseworker for
over a month and another month passes before Dillon was introduced to
his new caseworker.

When Dillon disappeared before his death, the

proctor agency, the proctor parent, and DJJS made little attempt 5 to
locate him. Sadly, Dillon was missing for three days before he died and
no one was searching for him.
The State, the Youth Corrections Act and Dillon's proctor parents
permitted Dillon to wander the community at will.
5

The State

The agency made one unsuccessful phone call on Friday before giving
up on locating Dillon.
18

caseworkers, the proctor agency and the proctor parent did not monitor
Dillon's location at any time. Dillon was also allowed to wander the
streets at night as his proctor parent permitted, his case workers knew
of, and in violation of curfew laws that supervise all children.
Ill)

ANSWERING THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS'
CERTIFIED
QUESTION OF STATE LAW IN THE
AFFIRMATIVE WOULD VIOLATE UTAH'S CONSTITUTION.
If a child in a proctor home were considered incarcerated in a

place of legal confinement, the Governmental Immunity act would
violate Utah's Constitution's: Art. 1 § 24, "Uniform Operation of Laws
Clause;" Art I § 11, "Open Courts Clause;" and Art XVI § 5, the
"Wrongful Death Clause."
a) "Uniform Operation

of Laws"

The Utah State Constitution provides: "All laws of a general
nature shall have a uniform operation." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 24 (1896).
Uniform Operation of Laws is violated where a child in foster care
is permitted to Yecover from the state for negligent placement, yet a
child in proctor care in a home with the exact same requirements could
not recover for the state's negligent placement.

19

"For a law to be constitutional under Article I, section 24, it is not
enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the
operation of the law be uniform. A law does not operate uniformly if
"persons similarly situated" are not "treated similarly" or if "persons in
different circumstances" are "treated as if their circumstances were the
same." Lee v. Gaufin 867 P.2d 572, (Utah 1993).
This Court held that the State of Utah, or specifically the Division
of Family Services, as a placement agency, could be held liable for its
failure "to properly evaluate the foster home, its failure to supervise
[the child's] placement and its failure to protect her from harm." Little
v. Division of Family Services, 677 P.2d 49, 50-52 (Utah 1983).
The statutory authority to license, investigate and monitor a
foster home and a proctor home are provided in the "Licensure of
Programs and Facilities" act U.C.A. § 62A-2-101 et seq. There is no
distinction in the act as to how a foster home is licensed, inspected or
investigated.

The licensing board lumps all youth programs in one

definition, specifically:
'Human services licensee' or 'licensee' means a youth
program, resource family home, or a facility or program,
licensed by the department, that provides care, secure
treatment, inpatient treatment, residential treatment,
20

residential support, adult day care, outpatient treatment,
domestic violence treatment, child placing services, or social
detoxification.
U.C.A. § 62A-2-101(12)(2007).
The licensing board responsibilities are to approve, deny, suspend,
and revoke licenses, for human services licensees and facilities are
required to protect the basic health and safety of clients and to enforce
the rules.

U.C.A § 62A-2-105 and 106.

There are no distinctions

between a client who is sent to a facility as a proctor child or as a foster
child. Therefore to allow foster child to recover from the state for its
negligent placement yet deny a proctor child placed in the exact same
home with the exact same requirements of compliance would violate
Utah's Constitutional Uniform Operations of Law Clause.
b)

Open Courts

Clause.

The Utah State Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and
no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
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UTAH

CONST, art. I, § 11. This provision, known as the "Open Courts

Clause," guarantees parties an access to a judicial forum in which their
petitions for redress may be heard.

The Utah Supreme Court has

adopted a two-pronged test to determine whether legislation runs afoul
of the Open Courts Clause. See Berry ex rel Berry v. Beechcraft Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
Under the Berry test, a law that abrogates a common law remedy
or cause of action is constitutional only if it meets one of two
requirements: 1) the law abrogating the remedy also provides an
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy; or 2)
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated, and the
elimination of the existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. Id.; see also Laney v.
Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, % 1f 49-55; 57 P.3d 1007, 1021-1023 (finding
the Act violated the Open Courts Clause when the Appellant right to
sue the government for a proprietary function was abrogated)

22

The application of the Act abrogated Whitney's claims against the
governmental defendants. 6
negligence

actions

against

In general, Utah courts have recognized
governmental

entities

since

prior

to

statehood. See Levy v. Salt Lake City, 1 P. 160, 162 (Utah 1881). More
specifically,

Utah

Courts have recognized common law

negligent

supervision and placement actions against governmental entities. Little
v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 54-55 (Utah 1983).
UGIA abrogates Whitney's claims in the following respect: expanding
the definition of "incarceration" to include the circumstances of the
instant case has, in essence, abrogated any cause of action that results
in a child's physical injury against a governmental entity. In this case
if the court adopts the State's broad definition of incarceration, parents
of the children removed from their homes would lose their common law
right to sue for injuries sustained for the negligent placement of
children in those homes.

6

More specifically, the 1987 amendments to the Governmental
Immunity Act, which included the laundry list of exceptions to the
original 1965 Act's waiver, abrogated Ms. Whitneys' claims. See
generally UTAH C O D E A N N . § 63-30-1 et seq. (1953 as amended 1966); cf.
UTAH CODE A N N . § 63-30-10 et seq. (1986 & Supp. 1989).
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Moreover,

the

Governmental

Immunity

Act

provides

no

alternative remedy for Whitney in this case. Under the defendant's
application of the Governmental Immunity Act, Whitney negligence
claims are simply foreclosed, and she is suffered to bear the costs of the
State's and its employees' negligence. And the act itself states no "clear
social or economic evil" to be eliminated by closing the doors of the
courts on injured parties, such as Whitney.
c)

Wrongful Death Guarantee

Clause.

The Governmental Immunity Act, as applied to Whitney's claims
for the wrongful death of their child, violated their constitutional right
to assert a wrongful death claim.
The Utah State Constitution provides:
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting
in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation,
except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in
death is provided for by law.
UTAH STATE CONST.,

art. XVI, § 5 (1896).

The Supreme Court of Utah has held that, where the Constitution
clearly prohibits the Legislature from abrogating a "right to action," it is
necessary to determine what the right was and who enjoyed it—at the
24

time the Constitution was adopted.

Tiede v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d

500, 503 (Utah 1986).
The Supreme Court erred in Tiede in concluding that the
government was immune from suit for wrongful death at the time the
Utah Constitution was adopted.

In fact, actions for wrongful death

were recognized prior to the adoption of the Utah Constitution.
Accordingly, the legislature did, in fact, abrogate an existing right of
action when it enacted the Governmental Immunity Act, in violation of
Article XVI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 504.
The Supreme Court of Utah will overturn precedent if convinced it
is clear that the rule was originally erroneous. Laney, 2002 UT 79, 45.
It should do so in the instant case.
The Supreme Court may not have been provided with accurate
historical information in 1986 when Tiede was decided and the Supreme
Court held that no cause of action existed for wrongful death against
the government when Utah adopted its constitution. 915 P.2d at 504.
Instead, the Supreme Court in Tiede relied on a procedural statute that
was enacted in 1896 in concluding that a claim for wrongful death did
not exist at the time of the adoption of the constitution. Id. (See 1898
25

Revised Statutes of Utah § 929)7. Id. According to Tiede, the Act on
which the Supreme Court based its determination that there was no
cause of action for wrongful death was enacted a year after the
constitution was adopted. Id.
In fact, as early as 1874 and through 1898, Utah had in effect a
wrongful death statute, known as "Lord Campbell's Act" or "An Act
providing damages for death caused by wrongful act, negligent or
default." That statute provided:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or
default is such as would, if the death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in
every such case, the person who, or the company or
corporation which would have been liable if death had
not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and
although the death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount to law to felony, (emphasis
added).
Comp. Laws Territory of Utah 1874; 2 Comp.1888 § 2961; See Mason v.
Union Pac. Ry. Co. 24 P. 796 (Utah 1890) (finding that Utah's wrongful
death statute created a new cause of action in the heirs to pursue a
7

This Act gave the Power to "[t]he governor, the secretary of state, and
the attorney general constitute a board of examiners, with power to
examine all claims against the State." Id. at 504
26

claim of negligence on behalf of the deceased if the negligence caused
his death).

Unlike the procedural statute, 1898 Revised Statutes of

Utah § 929, this statute was in effect at the time of the adoption of the
Utah Constitution.
Historically, common law gave a person injured without fault a
right to recover from the person or corporation whose negligence or
wrongful act produced injury, and, if death ensued from such negligence
or wrongful act, the statute gives his heirs a right of action to recover
compensation from the same person or corporation for the injury in
consequence of his death. Id, at 797. If a cause of action existed for
negligent acts against a government entity at the adoption of the Utah
Constitution, then with this statute a cause of action existed at the time
the constitution was adopted against the governmental entity for
wrongful death.
Accordingly, any statute that abrogates this right, as does the
governmental

immunity

act

as

applied

to

Ms.

Whitney,

is

unconstitutional pursuant to Article XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitution.
With the enactment of "Lord Campbell's Act," the question turns from
was there a cause of action against a governmental entity for wrongful
27

death, to was there a cause of action for negligence against the
governmental entity at the time of the enactment of the constitution.
This question is unequivocally and resoundingly YES.
See

Thomas

v. Springville

City,

35 P. 503 (Utah

1894)

(government liable for negligent maintenance of a bridge where plaintiff
was injured); Hopkins

v. Ogden City, 16 P. 596 (Utah 1888)

(government was negligent when horse fell through a break in a water
pipe); Yearance v. Salt Lake City, 24 P. 254 (Utah 1890); (government
negligently placed bricks across a walkway, which injured plaintiff);
Levy v. Salt Lake City, 16 P. 598, 604 (Utah 1887) (government is liable
for injuries caused through its neglect to keep in proper repair a ditch
constructed over private property); Tucker v. Salt Lake City, 37 P. 261
(Utah 1894) (government was negligent when it built a steep grade
sidewalk that caused plaintiff to fall and break her arm).
Further, even after the enactment of the procedural statute, 1898
Revised Statutes of Utah § 929, courts continued to hear cases against
governmental entities for negligence. See, Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 44 P.
1050 (Utah 1896) (government was negligent when Plaintiff fell into a
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hatchway behind city hall); Dwyer v. Salt Lake City, 57 P. 535 (Utah
1899) (government was negligent for not maintaining street).
Because negligence was a cause of action against a governmental
entity when the Utah Constitution was adopted; and because the
wrongful death statute was enacted prior to the adoption of the
Constitution; and because the wrongful death statute applied to every
case of negligence; a cause of action for wrongful death existed at the
time the Utah Constitution was adopted. The Governmental Immunity
Act abrogated that existing cause of action for wrongful death; therefore
the Governmental Immunity Act is unconstitutional as applied in this
case.
* * *

k k -k

k k k

1; -k k
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Whitney respectfully request that
this Supreme Court of Utah, uphold the district court of Utah's findings
and conclusions of law and find that Dillon Whitney was not
incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, or in the alternative find
the Governmental Immunity act is unconstitutional as applied to Ms.
Whitney.
Respectfully submitted this

10 day of July 2011.
STRIEPER LAW FIRM

ROBERT D.STRIEPER
2366 Logan Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Phone: 801-631-6421
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

DONNA WHITNEY and DESTRY
WHITNEY, individually and as parents
and heirs of DILLON WHITNEY,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE SERVICES, a subdivision of
the State of Utah; UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, a subdivision of the State of
Utah, STATE OF UTAH; QUEST
YOUTH SERVICES, LLC, a Utah
corporation; KYLE LANCASTER, DAN
MALDONADO, JASON KAUFUSI;
HENRY KAUFUSI; and DOES 1-10,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Case No. 2:09CV30DAK

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by the State of Utah, the
Department of Juvenile Justice Services, and the Utah Department of Human Services
(collectively referred to as "the State Defendants"); (2) Plaintiff Donna Whitney and Destry
Whitneys's ("Plaintiffs") Motion for Certification to the Utah Supreme Court; and (3) Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.1 A hearing was held on August 26,

1

On October 17, 2009, Plaintiff Destry Whitney, Dillon's Whitney's father, filed a
Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing with prejudice his claims against all Defendants. See
Docket #73. The court entered an Order dismissing Mr. Whitney's claims on November 6,2009.
See Docket #79. Therefore, only Donna Whitney's claims remain against the Defendants,
although the court will refer to "Plaintiffs" throughout this Memorandum Decision and Order.
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2009. At the hearing, Plaintiffs were represented by Robert D. Strieper. The State Defendants
were represented by Joni J. Jones, and Defendants Quest Youth Services, Jason Kaufusi, and
Henry Kaufusi were represented by James C. Lewis. The court has carefully considered the
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the matter under
advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to this motion. The court
has also considered Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, which was filed on
August 28, 2009, and the State Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum, which was filed on September 8, 2009. Now being fully advised, the court
renders the following Memorandum Decision and Order.
I. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS2
Sixteen-year-old Dillon Whitney was charged with several crimes from late 2006 through
early 2007. As a result of Dillon's delinquent conduct, the Honorable Andrew A. Valdez placed
Dillon on Probation and within the care and custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice
Services ("DJJS") for placement in a wilderness diversion program with Journey Ranch.
On June 5, 2007 Dillon became separated and lost for five hours during an overnight
"trek" with Journey Ranch. Journey Ranch, believing Dillon was an unauthorized leave risk, or
an "AWOL risk," recommended that Dillon be removed from Journey to be placed in a more
"secure facility" where he could be "under surveillance at all times." On June 9, 2007 Dillon was
removed from Journey and placed in custody at the Salt Lake Valley detention center.
On June 22, 2007, Judge Valdez ordered Dillon, who was still in the care and custody of

2

When deciding a Motion to Dismiss, the court is required to accept as true the
allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint. The allegations set forth below are merely allegations and
may or may not be factually accurate.
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DJJS, to be followed by DJJS for observation and assessment, with ultimate plans for DJJS to
arrange a community-based placement. On August 15, 2007, Judge Valdez, based upon the
advice of individuals at DJJS, ordered DJJS to place Dillon in a community-based placement.
On August 15, 2007, DJJS entrusted Jason Kaufusi ("J. Kaufusi") of Quest Youth
Services ("Quest") to place Dillon in a safe and secure proctor home and to track Dillon's
progress. J. Kaufusi placed Dillon at the "proctor home" of his brother, Proctor Henry Kaufusi
("Proctor H. Kaufusi"). According to Plaintiffs, DJJS's employees lost track and control of
Dillon after he was placed in the proctor home. On three separate occasions in early September
2007, a caseworker attempted to contact Dillon, but failed to make contact after being given the
excuse by J. Kaufusi that "it is hard to get hold of him [Dillon] after school."
On September 12, 2007, Dillon had a hearing for a joyriding offense. During this
hearing, a DJJS representative met with and informed Dillon that he would have a new
caseworker "within a month or so." On September 25, 2007 a DJJS representative informed J.
Kaufusi that Dillon would be assigned a new caseworker on October 6, 2007. On October 18,
2007, the new caseworker telephoned J. Kaufusi to introduce himself. On October 30, 2007,
Dillon learned of his new caseworker when J. Kaufusi arranged the meeting and introduced the two.
On November 16, 2007, the new caseworker met with Dillon for a second-and last-time to provide
Dillon with his contact information.
During the November 16, 2007 visit, the caseworker decided that Dillon was ready for home
visitations and motioned the court to approve them. That same day, Judge Valdez approved the
home visits based upon the caseworker's motion. The caseworker informed J. Kaufusi about the
order approving home visits, and the caseworker said he would approve the homevisits as long as
3
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Dillon continued to do well in his placement. The caseworker also informed J. Kaufusi that he could
make the determination on home visits as long as J. Kaufusi kept the caseworker updated.
Subsequently, J. Kaufusi approved a home visit for Thanksgiving Day, November 22, 2007, and
Friday, November 23, 2007, until 9:00 P.M.
On Friday, November 23, 2007, Proctor H. Kaufiisi twice called his brother, J. Kaufusi, at
Quest to inform him that Dillon had not returned home. J. Kaufusi, who was in St. George, Utah for
the weekend, made one futile attempt to notify Dillon's dad, Destry Whitney, that Dillon was AWOL
and had not returned to the proctor's home. J. Kaufusi also stated that he had left a message on the
caseworker's phone telling him that Dillon was AWOL, having not yet returned to the proctor
home.
On Saturday, November 24, 2007, an AWOL Dillon and some friends were at the
apartment of Victor Hernandez. At some point, Dillon fell down a flight of seventeen stairs at
Mr. Hernandez's apartment. Dillon's friends and Mr. Hernandez helped Dillon get back to Mr.
Hernandez's apartment and placed Dillon on a couch. The following day, Mr. Hernandez,
believing Dillon had died, put Dillon out in the stairwell. On Sunday, November 25, 2007,
someone discovered Dillon in the stairwell and called paramedics, who arrived at around 7:00
A.M. Dillon Whitney died en-route to Salt Lake Regional Hospital as a result of blunt force
trauma to his head.
According to Plaintiffs, during the time Dillon was missing, no one from the State of
Utah, DJJS, or Quest searched for him or reported him missing to any authority who could locate
him, as authorized by Utah Law U.C.A. §62A-7-104(10)(a). Also, Plaintiffs claim that the
proctor home consisted of a basement and upstairs. Proctor H. Kaufusi and his two children
4
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lived upstairs while the basement was converted to house the proctored children. Dillon was
placed in the basement of the proctor home with one other proctored child. Allegedly, Proctor
H. Kaufusi allowed the proctored children to come and go at will, and Plaintiffs allege that he
allowed the proctored children to violate their respective court orders, the laws of the State of
Utah, and the policy and procedures of DJJS.
II. THE PENDING MOTIONS
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs have sued Defendants on various negligence theories generally
stemming from an alleged breach of their duty to ensure that Dillon was in a secure, controlled
environment, and for civil rights violations under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The State Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims and the negligence
claims against them. Specifically, the State Defendants seek dismissal of the 1983 claims
because the State is not a "person" under § 1983. The State Defendants also seek dismissal of
the negligence claims against them because, they argue, under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, immunity is not waived for negligence if the alleged negligence arises out of one's
incarceration. Therefore, the State Defendants argue, the "incarceration exception" to the general
waiver of immunity for negligence precludes Plaintiffs' negligence claims.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that Dillon was not "incarcerated," and, thus, the incarceration
exception does not apply in this case. They also argue that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent the
court finds ambiguity concerning whether the incarceration exception would apply in these
circumstances, the court should certify this question to the Utah Supreme Court. Plaintiffs have

5
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also filed a Second Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.
III. DISCUSSION
A.

STATE DEFENDANTS5 MOTION TO DISMISS

1.

§ 1983 Claims

The State Defendants first argue that they are not persons for purposes of Section 1983,
and therefore, the civil rights claims against them must be dismissed. "Neither the state, nor a
governmental entity that is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, nor a state
official who acts in his or her official capacity, is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983."
Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905-06 (10th Cir. 1995). The court agrees, and Plaintiffs do
not dispute, that the § 1983 claims against the State Defendants must be dismissed.
2.

Negligence Claims

The State Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' negligence claims are barred by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA").3 Generally, immunity from suit is waived as to any
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4) (2008). The question presented by
the instant motion is whether an exception to the waiver of immunity applies. The State
Defendants claim that the "incarceration" exception applies in this case, compelling the dismissal
of the negligence claims against them.
The UGIA retains immunity for negligence claims if the injury

<(

arises out of, in

connection with, or results from . . . incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or
3

There is no dispute that the State Defendants are governmental entities performing
governmental functions.
6
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city jail, or other place of legal confinement" Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(j) (emphasis added). State
Defendants rely on several Utah cases for the proposition that the incarceration exception applies
in this case, barring the negligence claims against them. In Epting v. Utah, 546 P.2d 246, 244
(Utah 1976), for example, plaintiffs sued the State when their mother was killed by an inmate
who had escaped from the state prison. The inmate had escaped from a work-release program
when he killed the plaintiffs' mother. The court held that the placing of a prisoner in a work
release program was the exercise of a discretionary function, for which defendants enjoyed
immunity. As to the incarceration exception, the court also observed:
As to the status of [the inmate] vis-a-vis Defendants' prison, there
seems to be just two alternatives, either: (a) he had totally escaped
the control of the prison and was thus acting on his own so the
prison was not responsible for him; or (b) he was still under the
control of the prison authorities so that his conduct would "arise
out of the incarceration of any person in (the) state prison . . . " in
which latter instance the prison is immune from suit under the
statute.
Id. at 244; Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1989) (applying the incarceration exception to a
situation where a prisoner shot and injured the plaintiff during a court appearance). The court
finds that these cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because the both Kirk and Epting
involved individuals who were sentenced to serve time in prison and were therefore
"incarcerated" as that term is commonly understood.
The State Defendants also rely on Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1971), a case in
which the Utah Supreme Court found that the incarceration exception barred a negligence claim
when the decedent had voluntarily admitted herself to the Utah State Hospital. While this case is
not as easily distinguishable as Kirk and Epting, a close reading of the court's reasoning reveals

7
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that Emery, too, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Emery, the court analyzed the statute
pertaining to the state hospital and determined that the state hospital was a place of "legal
confinement," even though the decedent had voluntarily requested to be admitted, because a
specific provision in the statute that allowed for the possibility of the decedent being held against
her will. Id. at 1297. Specifically, once a voluntary patient requested to be released, the patient
was required to wait forty-eight hours to permit sufficient time for the superintendent of the
hospital to file a motion with a court to prevent the release. If a court granted such a motion,
there would be no release, and the patient could be confined against his will. Id.

The court

determined that a "voluntary" patient was as much confined as was an "involuntary" patient until
certain steps were taken to obtain a release. Id. at 1298. Thus, the court found that the
incarceration exception applied in that case.
In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the incarceration exception is inapplicable because
Dillon was not incarcerated in a legal place of confinement but was instead placed in a
community-based program. They contend that the situation in this case is more analogous to a
foster-care placement than to being "incarcerated." Then, they argue that Utah courts have
repeatedly recognized valid claims against the State for negligent placement of children in foster
care.
Having reviewed the case law concerning the incarceration exception to the waiver of
governmental immunity for negligence, the case law on negligence claims against the state
pertaining to foster-care placement, and the statutory language of the Juvenile Justice Services
statute, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that the incarceration exception to the waiver of
governmental immunity does not apply in this case.
8
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The Court of Appeals of Utah has stated that to incarcerate "is to imprison or to confine."
Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT App 494, ^ 6, 153 P.3d 789, 790. (2006).
In setting forth the laws pertaining to Juvenile Justice Services, the Utah legislature set forth that
youth offenders are either placed in "confinement in a secure facility or supervised in the
community." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-101(26) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). A
"secure facility" means any facility operated by or under contract with the division, that provides
24-hour supervision and confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for custody
and rehabilitation. Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In contrast, a "community-based program" as defined
by the legislature, "means a nonsecure residential or nonresidential program designated to
supervise and rehabilitate youth offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent with public
safety, and designated or operated by or under contract with the division." Id. § 62A-7-101(3).
Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to confine Dillon to a secure facility
but to place him in a community-based program, where he would be supervised and rehabilitated
"in the least restrictive setting, consistent with public safety." Id. The court cannot conclude
that Dillon was "incarcerated" in a place of "legal confinement" for purposes of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, the State Defendants are not entitled to immunity under
the incarceration exception to the waiver of governmental immunity for negligence.4
B.

PLAINTIFFS' OTHER MOTIONS

Plaintiffs have also requested that, if the court does not agree with their position, then the
court should certify the issue to the Utah Supreme Court. This request is moot in light of the

4

Because of the court's determination on this issue, the court need not address Plaintiffs'
arguments based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the UGIA.
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court's determination above.
In addition, Plaintiffs have requested leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, seeking
to add two causes of action: Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Utah State Constitution Article
I Section 7; and (2) they also seek to add the estate of Dillon Whitney as a party.
The court will permit Plaintiffs to add the estate of Dillon Whitney as a party and will
also permit Plaintiffs to add their civil rights claim based on the Utah Constitution. The court
finds that the Notice of Claim was sufficient to encompass such a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
(1) The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 28] is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The claims brought against the State Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 are DISMISSED, but the negligence claims against the State Defendants remain;
(2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification to the Utah Supreme Court [Docket #37] is
DENIED AS MOOT; and
(3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint [Docket #44] is
GRANTED.
DATED this 25th day of November, 2009.
BY THE COURT:

^^feXzg
DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge
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